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In Conversation With Pascal Engel
Ernest Sosa
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University (USA)
Résumé : C’est un plaisir de poursuivre une conversation de longue date avec
la personne qu’on honore, au sujet de questions relatives à la nature de la
croyance et de la manière dont elles affectent la théorie de la connaissance :
– La croyance peut-elle être de l’ordre de la performance ?
– Peut-elle être vraiment motivée, beaucoup moins motivée de manière ap-
propriée, par des raisons qui sont pragmatiques plutôt qu’épistémiques ?
Ce sont des questions sur lesquelles nous sommes en désaccord et que Engel ins-
crit dans un conflit plus général sur la sorte de normativité qui convient à l’épis-
témologie. Il m’attribue une sorte de normativité téléologique-axiologique,
tandis qu’il opte plutôt pour une normativité qui est déontique. Selon lui,
il existe des normes de croyance, au minimum une norme de vérité, et aussi
une norme de connaissance. Vous devez ne pas croire ce qui n’est pas vrai, et
même ce dont vous ne savez pas s’il est vrai, voir [Engel 2013], [Sosa 2013].
Abstract: It is a pleasure to continue a longstanding conversation with our
honoree on questions about the nature of belief and how that bears on the
theory of knowledge.
– Can belief be a sort of performance?
– Can it be motivated at all, much less properly motivated, by reasons
that are pragmatic rather than epistemic?
These are questions on which we disagree, under what Engel considers a more
general clash over the sort of normativity that is proper to epistemology. He
attributes to me a kind of teleological/axiological normativity, whereas he
opts rather for a normativity that is deontic. In his view there are norms of
belief, at a minimum a truth norm, and also a knowledge norm. You ought
not to believe what is not true, nor even what you do not know to be true, see
[Engel 2013], [Sosa 2013].
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What follows will continue our conversation on these issues, which I
will combine with a discussion of further, related issues concerning a proper
epistemology of judgment.
We will explore the epistemology both of judgment and of the correspond-
ing disposition, judgmental belief. Two epistemic puzzles will occupy us,
each of which has a plausible resolution through an account of the act of
judgment and of the disposition to perform that act. This helps to make
judgment interesting and worthy of more attention in epistemology, given
also its importance for a cooperative social species. After offering judgment-
theoretic solutions for our two puzzles, we then develop an epistemology of
judgment, and consider implications for the epistemology of memory. A further
section briefly considers the relation of judgment to competence and reflection,
and the suitability of free judgment to constitute objective knowledge.
In all of this I will be trying to buttress my own teleological/axiological
approach to epistemic normativity. My hope is to open logical space
for a rapprochment between that approach and the deontic approach
favored by Engel.
1 Two puzzles
1.1 Reasons to believe
Reasons to believe are epistemic reasons, dedicated reasons for
belief. Strictly speaking one cannot really believe for any other
sorts of reasons, such as those of practical advantage.
Some have reasoned thus, but others disagree. Centuries ago, another Pascal,
Blaise, argued for belief based on a high-stakes wager, and more recently
William James added his reasons in favor of willful belief.
Certainly one can be better off for holding a certain belief. What can
possibly be wrong with believing for that reason? If one can believe for reasons
at all, why not for that sort of reason? This is puzzling. Is it perhaps just that
one is unable to believe thus at will? Perhaps what is wrong with the idea of
believing for advantage is that it is impossible to believe based on practical
reasons simply because it is impossible to believe by choice, at will. Maybe so,
but this bears scrutiny.
Before delving into that, we turn next to our second puzzle.
1.2 Synchronic rationality versus diachronic
reliability
A belief might be acquired based on excellent perception, and then stored
through excellent memory. Such combined perception and memory might be
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extremely reliable. Compatibly with this, however, one might eventually forget
how one acquired and retained one’s belief. What if at that later juncture one
even acquires some direct evidence against its content?
Consider how irrationally stubborn it might be to retain one’s belief in the
teeth of synchronic evidence arrayed against it. Suppose the contrary evidence
is at least a match for whatever reason derives from the mere fact that one
then believes as one does. If so, one cannot just stamp one’s foot and keep on
believing just the same, not rationally.
What if the perception-cum-memory that accounts for one’s stored belief
is far more reliable than is a synchronic rationale that now speaks against
its content? Isn’t epistemic normativity determined by a truth connec-
tion? Why should the more truth-reliable process yield to the less reliable?
A puzzle remains.
2 Judgment and our two puzzles
It will help with these puzzles to focus next on judgment. By this I mean
a certain act of affirmation or the disposition to perform that act. But it
needs to be a particular sort of disposition to so affirm. It must not be a
disposition to affirm just for practical advantage. Such a merely pragmatic
disposition would amount to “make belief”. By contrast, real belief requires
that one be disposed to affirm even when simply endeavoring to answer
the relevant question correctly. Moreover, the act of affirmation amounts
to an act of judgment only if it is performed in the endeavor to affirm
correctly, with truth.
There is of course the act of public assertion in a natural language. And
there is very often the intention simply to inform—to inform and not to
misinform—as a dominant aim in human communication. In addition, given
our capacity for strategic self-deception, a similar distinction is in order for
judgment and belief as for assertion. Despite how susceptible we can be
to epistemically irrelevant pragmatic factors, there is at least the concept
of disinterested affirmation, influenced purely by the aim to get it right, to
believe correctly. Relatedly, there is also the disposition to affirm even when
no practical or other non-epistemic factors are operative. And this is the true
belief, by contrast with mere make-belief.
One can assert in the endeavor to mislead, of course, as when one lies.
Insincere assertions, moreover, are those that do not correspond to the
speaker’s beliefs. And something similar can occur even when the affirmation
is private, to oneself. Consider phenomena such as self-deception, and wishful
thinking. Consider in general affirmation out of the desire for psychological
comfort and avoidance of dissonance. In these cases again it seems plausible
that one affirms in a way that does not correspond to what one really believes.
One tries to fool oneself into affirming what one does not really believe. What
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then is this “real belief”, if it is not what one affirms even to oneself, in
foro interno? My suggestion is that what is really believed is what one would
affirm in the endeavor to get it right, to answer the relevant question correctly.
Clearly there can be a disparity between what one would affirm thus and what
one actually affirms in the endeavor to gain some practical advantage.
2.1 Dedicated epistemic reasons
a. We can now see why it might be thought that there cannot be practical
reasons for belief, why it is so plausible that belief can be based only on
epistemic reasons. We can make-believe for practical reasons, but we cannot
really believe for such reasons. This is because of how real belief requires
endeavoring to get it right. No other aim is constitutively relevant to real
belief, as opposed to make-belief. Reasons distinctively pertinent to real
belief, reasons thus distinctively appropriate, must therefore be truth-directed
reasons. These are the reasons that will bear on the objective constitutive of
real belief, namely the objective to get it right, to affirm with truth. Consider
affirming in a way that will bring some other advantage, such as psychological
comfort, athletic confidence, etc. No such affirming is pertinent to real
judgmental belief. Consider next reasons that pertain to whether affirming
will secure such advantages without pertaining to whether affirming will get it
right. No such reasons can then bear distinctively on real believing, since no
such reasons bear on one’s securing the objective constitutive of real believing.
That suggests a way to understand why the fact that believing would secure
advantage does not provide a reason of the sort “dedicated” to believing,
a true epistemic reason. Epistemic reasons pertain to the objective consti-
tutive of real believing. Practical reasons do not pertain to that objective.
In this way, only epistemic reasons, and not practical reasons, distinctively
pertain to believing.
b. Of course, when one believes judgmentally one does affirm: it is by
affirming that one so believes. One must affirm in a certain way, however, in
order to judge or to believe (judgmentally) by so affirming. One must affirm in
the endeavor to affirm correctly. Only such affirmation is truly judgment, and
only the disposition to so affirm counts as judgmental belief. But now consider
a subject who deliberates epistemically on the question whether p. He is
pondering how to judge on that question. This means that he is pondering how
to affirm, in the endeavor to affirm correctly. Of course, he might deliberate on
how to affirm in pursuit of other aims, or he might be subject subconsciously
to the attraction of other objectives in determining (still subconsciously) how
it seems to him on the matter whether p. He might become very confident
that p for reasons that pertain to practical objectives such as psychological
comfort. These processes are fueled by practical concerns and they eventuate
in degrees of confidence concerning the question whether p. That this can and
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does happen seems undeniable, just commonsensically, and is a well-known fact
of social psychology. But compare how plausible it also seems, nevertheless,
that one cannot consciously judge based on practical reasons, and that one
cannot believe judgmentally based on such reasons.
Again, we need to distinguish between mere affirming and the affirming
that constitutes judgment and, indirectly, judgmental belief. Judgment is
constituted not just by affirming but by affirming in the endeavor to get it
right. Consider aimings in general. Consider even consciously intentional
aimings, i.e., endeavors. When one’s action takes the form of an endeavor, it is
a means-end action. Insofar as one is choosing certain means towards a certain
end, one properly weighs only considerations that concern the effectiveness of
one’s means towards the attainment of one’s end. True, what one does can no
doubt have many other effects, and these not only can but must presumably
be taken into account in one’s final decision.
So, consider an assassin’s shot. He takes that shot as a means to killing
his victim. He shoots in the endeavor to assassinate. Insofar as that is
his endeavor, then, his relevant reasons are those relevantly related to the
attainment of his aim. Consider how he must deliberate in a way that will
bear on his intentional means-end action. He must consider what bears on
the effectiveness of the available means towards attainment of his aim. As for
further effects that might flow from his taking certain means, these are not
relevant to the aim that he is endeavoring to attain. But of course they do
bear on his shooting as he does, and he must take them into account in his
all-things-considered decision whether to then shoot as he does.
Similarly, one can and does allow practical considerations to bear on
what one is willing to affirm, especially in public assertion, but even in
private assent. All sorts of practical concerns can bear, properly so, on the
propositional attitudes that one thereby hosts. If some such concerns do not
bear on how one judges, nor on what one judgmentally believes, that is because
judgment is not just affirmation but affirmation in the endeavor to get it right.
And there are limits to what can be rationally allowed to bear on one’s pursuit
of that objective.
c. It might be replied that not only can one not judge based on practical
reasons. One cannot even affirm for such reasons. And this has some
plausibility. Yet this intuition cannot be explained by appeal to the difference
between affirming and judging. This does seem quite plausible as well. But
our explanation of why one cannot judge for practical reasons is of course
inapplicable to the fact, if it is a fact, that one cannot affirm for practical
reasons. It might be thought that if we can really know in the armchair that
one cannot affirm for practical reasons, this must then be a necessary truth of
some sort, one accessible to a priori insight or argumentation. But consider
the following alternative: Why can’t our knowledge that we cannot affirm for
practical reasons be rather like our knowledge that we cannot jump over tall
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buildings, or even like my knowledge that I cannot now choose to bury my
pen deep into my right eye. These impossibilities pertain not to categorical
metaphysical necessities but only to metaphysical necessities relative to our
actual constitution. Our inability to jump over buildings is relative to our
physical constitution, which might have been different, and relative also to
our location on the surface of a massive planet. And something similar seems
true of one’s inability to choose to stab one’s own eye, this being an inability
that need not even be shared by every human at all times, not by Vincent Van
Gogh for one. I see no reason why our knowledge that we are unable to affirm
for practical reasons could not be similar. Perhaps there is a good reason why
humans find it so difficult to affirm (even to oneself) for advantage. Perhaps
there are good evolutionary reasons why neither stabbing oneself in the eye
nor believing for advantage is something we go in for, nor even something
most of us could go in for, if we tried. Moreover, we might be able to know
in the armchair that we are thus constituted in the same sort of way that we
can know in the armchair, just by drawing on our commonsense background
knowledge, that we cannot jump over tall buildings.
So, I do share the attraction to the thought that we are unable not only
to judge for practical advantage but even to affirm for practical advantage.
However, the latter, and the way in which we know it, is not something
that we can explain philosophically in the way we can explain why it is,
and how we can know, that we cannot judge for advantage. So it is the
latter intuition, which is amenable to philosophical explanation, that I have
mainly addressed here. Still, comparisons with choices and physical actions
beyond our ability help us understand how we could know that we lack such
an ability without any great philosophical mystery. On this suggestion, our
inability derives from being constituted in a certain way, such that it is not
physically possible to be so constituted and yet attain the outcome that we
take to be beyond our reach.
d. Nevertheless, there is a way in which practical reasons can still bear
importantly on what one believes. Thus, one may form a belief at all on
the weather forecast because one prefers not to get wet. In this sort of way
practical reasons can pertain importantly to real believing. A hired assassin
shoots as he does for the reason that he wants to get paid, even if getting paid
does not bear on the success of that shot in killing his victim. In this sort of
way, we might need to believe with truth for many diverse practical reasons.
We may need to get it right as to the best means to secure our ends. This
does of course provide important practical reasons for much real believing.
This sort of practical reason lies behind much of our inquiry and judgment on
a great variety of topics. We still need distinctively epistemic reasons, however,
ones dedicated to real belief, epistemic reasons with their indispensable role
in proper real believing, a role that cannot be filled by practical reasons.
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e. So much for our first puzzle, concerning reasons for belief. We turn next to
the second, involving a contrast between synchronic rationality and diachronic
reliability.
2.2 Storage of beliefs in memory
a. What is it that one retains when one acquires and stores a belief? Is it a
certain degree of confidence, a resultant seeming strong enough to enable one
to affirm? Can that possibly be retained no matter what may come to light
epistemically in a later situation? Well, now there are two possibilities. Either
the new situation contains determinative contrary reasons, which require
relinquishing one’s supposedly stored belief, or it does not. If it does, then of
course one must give up one’s belief. Supposing the new situation does not
contain any such fresh reasons, however, what then can one properly retain?
Is it the same degree of confidence that one enjoyed as one acquired the belief
perceptually? Not necessarily, even if no fresh contrary reasons later come
into view. For example, one’s epistemic situation changes dramatically as
an excruciating headache recedes into the past. It is one thing to suffer the
headache and believe accordingly at that very moment, and it is quite another
to believe that one did suffer that headache in the past. As time passes one’s
stored confidence that one then suffered a headache dwindles, properly so.
Seconds later one is still in a position to affirm that one did have that headache.
But that eventually lapses with the steady loss of confidence, even when no
contrary reasons ever come into view.
As one forgets the details of a given belief’s acquisition, that belief may
be greatly reduced in its reflective standing. Suppose it is now in storage,
with the believer no longer able to endorse it reflectively with conviction.
Suppose even that some evidence now comes to light against its content.
This evidence need not be compelling in order to create a problem. It
might counter the belief either by rebutting it (while providing evidence for
its denial) or by undercutting it (while providing evidence that one is ill-
placed or ill-equipped to hold it). Either way, the evidence that comes to
light may suffice to preclude proper endorsement of that belief. After all, the
believer may now be reduced to relying simply on his having that belief in
storage. And, although it does give him some reason to believe accordingly,
in line with “methodological conservatism”, such evidence may provide slim
justification by comparison with the initial, acquisitional evidence. A belief’s
continuing justification might thus diverge wildly from the reliability of the
diachronic process that secures its continuing storage in memory. Consider
the standing provided at that later time by the total evidence then available,
including the presence of the belief in the believer’s memory. How the belief
then fits the new total evidence will surely trump its diachronic reliability.
It will defeat any such mere reliability in determining what that subject should
then believe judgmentally.
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In this light, let us now reconsider what it is proper for one to store, both
in the way of (a) functional seemings, inclinations, and credences; and also
in the way of (b) judgmental beliefs. What one stores either way will be
dispositional, in some important respect.
Consider then the dynamics of dispositions. Take a pot of boiling water,
with its disposition to burn your hand upon immersion. In a pot taken off the
fire, that disposition wanes steadily as the water cools. It will be sustained
indefinitely so long as the pot is kept on a strong enough fire. As it is moved
steadily away from the fire, however, its disposition to burn weakens and
eventually disappears.
Is that not the normal fate of a dispositional belief put in storage? As
it loses contact with the initial evidence, the relevant credence weakens with
increasing distance, and the disposition to judge is eventually lost. At any
later time one will be properly disposed to judge only if one is then confident
enough. Loss of confidence will thus eventually entail loss of judgmental belief.
What is properly stored is hence not a persisting degree of confidence,
along with a persistent disposition to judge accordingly. What is properly
stored is rather a changing degree of confidence eventually dependent just on
the continuing confidence itself, with no ulterior synchronic basis. Moreover,
this degree of confidence must be high enough to sustain properly a disposition
to judge, a judgmental belief. This is what really matters in belief storage.
What we want to draw from storage—our own or a neighbor’s—is judgments
and assertions with proper epistemic status, i.e., ones reliably enough acquired
and stored. That is how we can put information to work in our practical
or theoretical reasoning, and that is also how we can share information and
collaborate epistemically. Judgments and assertions have pride of place for
epistemic purposes.
b. We humans need a store of dispositions to affirm, whether to oneself or to
others, in ordinary settings of reasoning or communication. We cannot often
store awareness of how our beliefs were initially acquired, nor can we retain
a running awareness of their continuing basis. Most relevant to our epistemic
welfare and cooperation, moreover, are acts of judgment or of assertion. It
is through such acts that propositions can figure as premises of reasoning,
practical or theoretical. Human cooperation requires sincerity, moreover,
sincerity to oneself (avoidance, for example, of wishful thinking) and sincerity
to interlocutors.
What we can properly “store”, then, what we can retain with epistemic
propriety, is a disposition to affirm, and a corresponding confidence, provided
we are steadily sensitive to incoming fresh evidence and also to loss of reliability
with passage of time, which varies both with subject matter and with quality
of relevant memory. One must be sensitive to all these factors in regulating
one’s degree of confidence and one’s corresponding willingness to affirm.
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Once we see the complexity involved in proper “retention” of stored beliefs,
the supposed clash between synchronic rationality and diachronic reliability
seems less puzzling. At any time, one must judge in line with the total evidence
in one’s possession at that time. This will of course include the fact that one
then has a certain degree of resultant confidence on the relevant question.
This degree of confidence results from the various evidentially relevant factors
that bear on the matter, such as perception, testimony, inference, etc. Among
these will of course be found the sheer mnemonic seeming, how it seems to
oneself that the question is to be answered if one puts aside all other sources
involved. At any given juncture various sources of evidence may be operative,
the mnemonic appearance being only one of them. No matter how strongly it
may mnemonically seem that the question is to be answered, that cannot be the
only factor that bears properly on how one is now to judge on that question. In
addition to whatever fresh perception or testimony may be relevant, one needs
to consider the meta-question as to how reliable one’s mnemonic seemings of
that sort are, in light of the subject matter, the length of time involved, et
cetera. Surely such assessment will always be relevant to how one can properly
judge given the mnemonic appearances, along with other pertinent factors.
Since at any given time nearly all of one’s knowledge is “stored”, our
reasoning concerning proper storage highlights the importance of reflective
knowledge specifically. Nearly all of one’s knowledge must involve a com-
petent meta-assessment of competence, and a judgment, or a disposition to
judge, that manifests such meta-competence. Accordingly, nearly all of one’s
knowledge requires ascent above the animal level, to the level of reflective
knowledge. This is so at least for one’s judgmental knowledge at any given
juncture. What one judgmentally knows at t is what one knowledgeably judges
or is disposed to judge at t. And this will depend not just on the mnemonic
appearances at that time but also on every other relevant source, includ-
ing one’s meta-competence to assess one’s relevant first-order competences,
mnemonic and otherwise.
Accordingly, there is no real clash between diachronically competent stored
belief and synchronically rational judgment. What is properly stored is not
really a judgmental belief, a disposition to judge, no matter what ensues.
What is properly stored is rather a mnemonic seeming of a certain magnitude.
But at any given later juncture this cannot automatically determine how the
subject should then judge. That would seem absurd given the many other
sources that may later be operative, which must also be given their due. To
suppose that retentive memory must trump all other sources whenever there
is a clash would be as arbitrary as the selection of any other distinctive source
for the place of honor. Why not select testimony? Or perception? No such
single-minded selection can be plausible. There is no substitute for a balanced
approach. But this approach must be implemented at a given juncture, when
a judgment is to be rendered. The balance to be struck accordingly involves
the synchronically operative factors, all of them, including not only memory
but also testimony, perception, etc. All of these sources will deliver seemings,
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vectors that must be summed for a resultant credence, which if high enough
can then also yield judgment with epistemic propriety.
3 More on the epistemology of judgment
and of memory
1. Judgments manifest the subject’s freedom, being endeavors determined
by free choices and intentions. They are fully attributable doings, by contrast
with one’s reflex kick under the doctor’s mallet; with one’s walking onto
a mined field, unknowingly; and with one’s experiencing a checkerboard
pattern as one sees a chess board in good light from above. Judgments
stand in contrast even with one’s being inclined to assent accordingly. This
inclination can of course derive from the proper functioning of one’s cognitive
systems, including prominently the visual system. But it would not derive
from a free, voluntary rational assessment and choice. In this hierarchy—
from experience, to seemings, to resultant seemings (or credences)—only
judgment in the endeavor to judge correctly is a doing fully attributable to
oneself as free agent. Such judgment is epistemically proper if and only if
rendered competently enough.
As we complete a process of addition in one’s head, we may be free to judge
either way without fault. If we judge affirmatively, moreover, we may thereby
acquire a “judgmental” belief. This is a belief constituted by a disposition to
affirm upon considering the relevant question when one endeavors to answer
it correctly. Thus might a belief be acquired freely, voluntarily; and it might
then be stored long enough that one forgets how it was acquired.
That again leads to our stand on what constitutes a dispositional belief.
As was argued earlier, not all forces that affect one’s willingness to affirm
also plausibly affect one’s judgmental belief. Desire for mental comfort and
need to avoid dissonance might remove my willingness to affirm without much
affecting my judgmental belief. Other non-epistemic factors might have a
similar effect: wishful thinking, for one. These factors might even install
a willingness to deny, again without much affecting my judgmental belief.
On the present view, such manipulation might yield make-belief, but not real
belief. Put aside such manipulation, whether conscious or subconscious, and
consider only what one would affirm if one endeavored to affirm with truth.
Barring sheer epistemic defect, one would then likely affirm based on evidence,
or on whatever other epistemically proper factors may be operative. Real
judgmental belief requires the disposition to affirm in the endeavor to answer
the pertinent question correctly. Pragmatic factors influence one to affirm or
deny or suspend in ways independent of this endeavor. What one affirms under
such influence does not reveal one’s true belief; it reveals rather how one is
willing to make-believe. But note well: “in the endeavor” does not mean just
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“while endeavoring”. Rather it means something like “exclusively through the
effect of this endeavor, discounting other influences”.
2. What then is it that we store by way of judgmental belief ? It would be
a disposition to judge, of course, but what might be its content? Suppose I
am convinced that it is unbearably hot in Havana in the early afternoon of a
certain day. I store this conviction and the disposition to judge accordingly, in
the endeavor to answer that question correctly. What exactly does this latter
disposition amount to? I will hardly retain this disposition indefinitely as my
relevant memories fade. If, after a few days, someone disputes the claim, I may
well give up affirming it. My disposition was not a disposition to continue to
be attracted indefinitely, even as the positive evidence recedes and contrary
evidence appears. It is more qualified than that. It involves a gradually
diminishing disposition to be attracted to assent to that propositional content
provided no sufficient contrary evidence comes into view, and it involves also
a corresponding disposition to judge accordingly provided one’s degree of
confidence remains at a certain (high enough) level.
Consider now the latter judgmental disposition, the disposition to judge
affirmatively at any arbitrary later time when one considers the question,
provided one’s confidence then remains at a certain (high enough) level. This
seems a will-based policy, given that such judgments are free and voluntary.
What is its content?
Recall our stance on the question of heat in Havana. This stance amounts
to a policy to answer affirmatively in the endeavor to answer correctly, provided
one’s confidence remains at a certain (high enough) level. But is this not just a
special instance of a quite general policy? I mean the general policy, concerning
all questions, to affirm at any given time provided one’s credential confidence
is then high enough? Yes, fair enough. So, what is really distinctively stored
as one learns that p is rather a certain distinctive mnemonic seeming, one that
does not need any further boost from any other source, whether perceptual,
or testimonial, or of whatever sort. This distinctive mnemonic seeming may of
course vary in magnitude, and its continuing magnitude will properly depend
on one’s meta-assessment of the reliability of one’s mnemonic seemings of that
sort (in respect of subject matter, length of time, etc.).
3. Something else is also stored once one learns that p, in addition to the
lingering mnemonic seeming of a certain magnitude. I mean the policy to
affirm that p when the question comes up, at least to oneself, provided one’s
resultant credence continues to be high enough.
Still, what is the full content of that policy? What in particular is
“high enough” confidence? What is the degree of confidence required, other
than confidence that meets the required threshold? If we do not have an
independent conception of that threshold, can we really have a policy in place
that explains what it is to believe judgmentally?
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4. Can there be policies that are not articulable except trivially? Compare
riflemen with archers. A rifleman may have a policy that he can formulate
linguistically as “Shoot if and only if the (already chosen and addressed) target
is in the crosshairs”. There is nothing quite like that for the archer. There
are no crosshairs in archery. But is there not a will-based policy that the
archer follows similarly nonetheless? The good archer takes careful aim and
releases only when he judges that the moment is right. Presumably he is
guided by some perception of an appropriate combination of factors like the
following: the orientation of the arrow, the tension of the bow, the perceived
distance of the target, the sensed wind across the relevant space, and so on.
Clearly, the relevant combination of factors is beyond any human’s ability to
articulate fully (except trivially as “when the moment is right in all relevant
respects, or in such and such respects”). Nor does it seem plausible that the
archer will have some ability to conceptualize the relevant combinations of
factors independently of “the combination, or a combination, that makes it
appropriate now to release the arrow”. In this respect there is no difference
between the expert and the beginner. Neither has the ability to formulate their
basis for action except thus trivially. Yet there is much more to the relevant
conscious contents of the expert archer’s mind as he takes a shot, than there
is to the contents of the rank beginner as he takes his shot. Both of them
may shoot in the belief that “the moment is right in all relevant respects”. Yet
the expert is responding to certain factors systematically in a way that helps
explain his expertise. For the beginner there is no such sensitivity, since there
is no such expertise.
5. Who would deny that it is possible to judge rashly, when one’s confidence
is too low? Appropriate judgment requires that the relevant confidence be high
enough. Compare the expert archer. As we have seen, he hosts a de re “policy”
of releasing his arrow provided the moment is right in certain respects. But no
such policy is available to the beginner until he undergoes a period of training
and practice. Something similar seems true for the judgmental believer who
takes the bird in the distance to be a duck, not a goose. First, there is the well-
based confidence that it is a duck; second, there is the well-based corresponding
judgment. And this latter will require the believer to be sensitive to when the
confidence is high enough to warrant judgment.
How then should we think of the stored judgmental belief that p? It
is a disposition to freely judge affirmatively upon considering the relevant
question in the endeavor to answer it correctly. Normally, that judgmental
disposition will be conditional on the subject’s retaining a strong enough
confidence. Storage of judgmental belief will thus require corresponding
storage of high enough confidence. This stored confidence is itself dispositional.
It is a disposition to be (consciously) attracted to assent upon considering the
question. If proper, it will not be a disposition to be so attracted come what
may. Rather, it will be a disposition to continue to be so attracted absent
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relevant change in the subject’s epistemic situation. There must be no such
change that tilts the balance against assenting.
It is not enough that one simply uphold a verbal or conceptual formula of
the form:
I will sustain my degree of confidence provided there is no change
that tilts the balance against the content of my confident credence.
This policy someone might endorse despite being inadequately sensitive to
changes that tilt the balance, or to the need to adjust his confidence in response
to such changes. It is the latter, de re, policy that the competent epistemic
agent will uphold. And his upholding of it will amount to his being disposed,
with regard to such changes (that tilt the balance of evidence, etc.), to change
his degree of confidence in response to them.
4 Competence, suspension, and reflection
1. Given that judgments are free intentional actions, can they be responsive
to the facts so as to constitute knowledge? Isn’t true knowledge required to
be more tightly bound to the objective facts? If knowledge is apt belief, belief
that gets it right in a way that manifests the believer’s competence, is this
compatible with the belief’s being a judgment, or a judgmental belief, a free
intentional action, or a disposition to so act?
A competence is a disposition to succeed reliably enough upon aiming to
attain a certain outcome. So, a disposition is a competence only if its triggers
are attempts or aimings. Such a disposition amounts to a competence only
with a sufficient yield of success.
We should distinguish functional from volitional—will-based—
competences. A heart is normally competent to help move the blood.
This competence is functional. Volitional competences are competences to
succeed reliably enough in endeavors, in volitional attempts. For example, the
competence of a good, safe driver is largely volitional. It is based on policies
that he adopts and sustains voluntarily.
A good archer is competent to hit the mark with his arrows. A good
driver is competent to drive safely and efficiently. However, these competences
may be volitional in two importantly different respects. The archer shoots
freely, at will. So, his performances are free acts, and his competence as
an archer is a competence to succeed with such freely chosen and executed
performances. The driver also exercises his driving competence through freely
chosen and executed performances. But there is a further respect in which
the driver’s competence is volitional. His competence itself largely resides
in his will. He adopts and sustains certain policies whereby he possesses his
driving competence. A freely chosen and sustained policy can constitute, or
help constitute, a (volitional) competence. Thus, consider the good driver’s
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freely chosen and sustained policy of stopping at red lights, or that of signaling
his turns. There may thus be an important difference between the driver and
the archer in respect of the seat of their respective competences. There is at
least a notable difference of degree. We shall return to this in what follows.
Seemings, initial or resultant, are functionings. The subject’s doings as
he thus functions are in a way passive. They are not fully attributable to his
person, as fully his own doings. Judgment, however, goes beyond passive
seemings, even beyond confident credences (resultant inclinations that are
vector sums of the various seemings with their respective sources). Thus, if one
computes a long sum in one’s head, which yields a seeming of some magnitude,
one faces the choice whether to accept that seeming and judge accordingly.
This seems a choice one may be free to make. And agents identically placed
might here make opposing choices with no fault on either side.
Suspension is not the mere omission of both affirmation and denial. Nor
is it such double-omission while attending to the question. At least proper
suspension must be an intentional double-omission that is adequately based
(through risk assessment). But if suspension is thus intentional (at least when
proper), then the counterpart judgment and denial must also be intentional
(at least when proper). All three of these are hence actions (when proper)
since intentional doings are actions. Moreover, some at least of these are
free and voluntary actions. These are the free and voluntary judgments and
suspendings (of judgment).
2. A driver can arrive safely in a way that manifests competence, surely,
even when much of that competence is constituted by freely chosen policies.
There is no apparent reason why a judgmental believer could not attain truth
through a judgment whose accuracy similarly manifests competence, even if
this competence too is importantly constituted by freely chosen policies.
In arriving thus at the correct attitude one does best to assess one’s
level of complete competence with respect to the question addressed. This
includes three components. The first is one’s basic constitutional competence,
one’s skill in answering such questions. The second is one’s current shape for
employing that skill. Is one awake, alert, sober, etc.? Third and last is one’s
situation, including any relevant external relations. Is the light adequate? How
far is the object? And so on. All three of these—skill, shape, situation—are
constitutively involved in one’s complete competence. Only such complete
SSS-assessment (however quick and subconscious) can properly determine
whether one is likely enough to answer the question correctly. A negative
conclusion would require one intentionally to forbear from answering. Instead
one would need to suspend.
To affirm with full epistemic competence, one must competently assess the
epistemic risk as low enough. One then affirms on a basis shared with the
intention implemented: the basis provided by the favorable risk assessment.
In so affirming one then falls short unless that basis amounts to knowledge.
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It follows that the affirmation will itself fall short unless it amounts to
reflective knowledge. One needs to answer the first-order question correctly,
manifesting thereby one’s relevant first-order competence. The exercise of
that competence must itself be intentional, moreover, based on the second-
order assessment of the relevant risk. Finally, this assessment must in turn
manifest sufficient competence.
Above animal-level fixation of belief, no matter how reliable, one finds the
reflective epistemic status. This calls for an epistemology with both animal and
reflective components. Reflective competence is required for the higher status.
We need not always seek that status, nor is it a status required for proper trust
in our first-order beliefs. Despite our not needing to do so, however, we often
do seek that level of scrutiny and endorsement, as we consider a question in a
setting that requires reflection. Plausibly, a belief would always attain a higher
epistemic status if it did gain proper endorsement through such scrutiny.
5 Concluding remarks
Our account of the act of judgment and of the disposition to perform
that act enabled proposed solutions to our two puzzles: first, the puzzle
of why reasons for belief must be distinctively epistemic; second, that of
why synchronic rationale trumps diachronic competence, even when it is
(by hypothesis) less truth-reliable. These proposed solutions led to further
development of an epistemology of judgment, including implications for the
nature and epistemology of retentive memory. And this led us finally to explore
the relation of judgment to competence and reflection, and the suitability of
free judgment to constitute objective knowledge.
How deep is my disagreement with Engel’s ethics and epistemic psychology
of belief? I suspect that it is not very deep. As he notes in our earlier exchange,
there is no powerful reason for me to resist the idea that belief has an ethics,
nor need I object to the notion that truth and knowledge are norms of belief.
As for the broader framework within which we both write in epistemology,
I very much agree with his minimalist account of truth, and much of his
rationale for that account, and have myself defended in print such objectivist
minimalism [Engel 2002].
Still I hope to have cleared logical and epistemological space for an
account of belief, and of judgmental belief more specifically, according to
which belief is after all a performance, one with an aim relative to which
it can be teleologically assessed in terms of the normative categories of virtue
epistemology. Thus, I submit that beliefs fall under such a AAA normative
structure, since they can not only be accurate, and adroit or competent, but
also their accuracy can manifest their competence, so that they can also be
apt. Within the space thus cleared for a virtue epistemology, moreover, we can
also answer plausibly the question of why and how belief admits only epistemic
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and not pragmatic reasons. So, I hope to have promoted a true meeting of the
minds, with a philosopher that I have long admired, whether in disagreement
or in agreement. 1
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1. Here I have developed further the virtue epistemology expounded most recently
and fully in [Sosa 2015].
